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Stability Operations: A Guiding Framework
for "Small Wars" and Other Conflicts of the
Twenty-First Century?

Kenneth Watkin*
{IJf intemationallaw is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law
of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of intemationallaw. J
Introduction

T

he ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan provides a stark example of the
challenging and complex operating environment in which the international
community is seeking to establish and maintain the rule oflaw. Professor Hersch
Lauterpacht's entreaty in the aftermath of World War II for lawyers to address the
myriad oflaw of war issues not covered by the Geneva Conventions with a feeling
of humility is no less applicable today regarding attempts to regulate contemporary confli ct. 2 Twenty-fiest-century conflict rarely meets the traditional legal criteria of an international armed conflict. Instead, operational lawyers have to apply a
normative framework primarily designed to regulate State-on-State conflict to increasingly complex security situations involving warfare both within States and
across international borders. Such operations range from relatively benign
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humanitarian relief operations to significant combat operations, such as those in
Afghanistan involving the multinational forces assisting the Afghan government.
Lawyers should not feel isolated in this endeavor, as the challenge of categorizing conflict and operating in complex security situations is not a uniquely legal
one. Military commanders are also seeking to have doctrine adapted, and where
necessary developed, to address such conflicts. The doctrinal goal of attempting to
categorize operations that do not fit within the classic notions of offensive or defensive operations between State armed forces has led to the development of the
concept of "stability operations." This artide explores the relationship between the
law of armed conflict and what is largely a US-led initiative to place a myriad of
military missions, often occurring at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, under
one overarching doct rinal umbrella.3 The analysis includes an outline of the limits
of the contemporary normative legal framework in governing operations designed
to bring stability to failed or failing States.
Stability operations will be assessed in four parts, commencing with an outline
of the definition, scope and purpose of those operations. A key question is the degree to which such operations are actually new or whether the concept is in reality a
catch-all term for a variety of missions that have always challenged both doctrine
writers and lawyers alike. Secondly, the law governing operations at the lower end
of the conflict spectrum will be explored. Emphasis will be placed on looking at
whether international law has adapted to account for such conflict, or ifit has, like
military doctrine, focused on State-on-State conflict. Thirdly, the applicability of
the term "stability operations" in a coalition environment will be explored. Given
the prevalence of such operations, the adoption, or lack thereof, of this doctrinal
approach by potential allies provides an important indicator of the maturity and
potential viability of the concept.
Finally, potential limitations on this forward-thinking American doctrinal approach to addressing the contemporary "war amongst the people'" will be considered. While there is a possibility for failure, the significant potential this new
categorization of conflict presents in seeking to articulate a realistic regime in
which to conduct operations in the existing complex security environment will be
explored.

Stability Operations
The Doctrine
The analysis will now turn to outlining the stability operations doctrine, exploring
its scope and relationship with doctrine governing combat operations, and situating stability operations in a historical context regarding previous efforts to
412

Kenneth Wa tkin
categorize such conflict. "Stability operations" is a relatively recent doctrine developed by the prolific US military doctrine production process. In its simplest form,
such operations are defined as "[ m ]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across
the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and
regions."s This defmition, found in Department of Defense (DoD) Directive
3000.05, elevates such operations to "a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated
across all DoD activities .. .. "6 The goal of these operations is ambitious:
The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore
essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long term goal is to help develop
indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of
law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society?

Among the activities envisaged are rebuilding indigenous security forces, correctional facilities and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment; reviving or building the private sector; and developing representative
governmental institutions. 8 The partners for US military forces include " U.S.
Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global
and regional international organizations ... U.S. and foreign nongovernmental
organizations ... and private sector individuals and for-pro fit companies . .. ."'1
While the directive clearly anticipates that many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign or US civilian professionals it clearly, and perhaps
for many military planners ominously, states: "[ nJonetheless, U.S. military forces
shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when
civilians cannot do so. "10
The fulfillment of the "stability operations" mission presents a significant challenge. Indeed some might think it at best aspirational ifit were not for the fact such
operations comprise the types of missions presently being conducted, not just by
the US military, but also by the wider international community. This is evident not
only in Iraq, which is often cited as the most glaring example of what can go wrong
when mission planning has not fully contemplated or provided for the maintenance of order and the re-establishment of governance institutions when traditional fighting has concluded, but also in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, NATO, the
United Nations, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations
are all faced with the tremendous security, governance and organizational challenges of trying to rebuild or, perhaps more accurately, build a State. Both the Afghanistan and Iraq missions provide clear examples of the activities stability

413

A Guiding Framework /o r "Small Wars" and Other Conflicts
operations can encompass, as well as the policy and legal challenges they pose.
Given the post-2001 emergence of the doctrine they appear to have been primary
catalysts for its development.
However, there is a significant danger in looking at stability operations through
the narrow lens of Iraq or Afghanistan. The activities captured under the stability
operations doctrine are much broader than those two major conflicts. This idea is
reflected in the foreword to the 2008 US Army Fie1d Manual on "Stability Operations," where Lieutenant General William Caldwell notes. "America's fu ture
abroad is unlike1y to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq."ll It is the very b readth of the
stability operations doctrine that highlights not only the complex nature of the existing security challenge. but also the deficiencies in the underlying legal framework within which contemporary security operations take place.
The "Catch-All" of Con flict
The complexity of stability operations results from a number of factors. including
the wide scope of activities that fall within its definition . To fully understand that
scope it is necessary to look at recent US Army doctrine. That doctrine has undergone a significant revision with the 2008 Army manual replacing an earlier version
produced just in 2003 .12 The speed with which this doctrine has undergone that revision appears to reflect not only the dynamic environment within which such operations are conducted, but also the impact of "lessons learned" information being
incorporated into military doctrine.
While not as specific as its predecessor in terms of identifying types of operations, the new doctrine indicates that stability operations occur across a spectrum
of conflict from peace to general war and can include
a wide range of stability tasks performed under the umbrella of various operational
environments--To support a partner nation during peacetime military engagement.
After a natural or man-made disaster as part of a humanitarian-based limited
intervention.
During peace operations to enforce international peace agreements.
To support a legitimate host-nation government during irregular warfare.
During major combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict
activities.
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• In a post-conflict environment following the general cessation of organized
hostilities. J3

Consistent with the 2003 version, the doctrine found in the 2008 manual envisages stability operations to be carried out during humanitarian disaster relief,
peacetime support to other nations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and post-conflict occupation. Given the general
wording provided in the new doctrine there is no reason to believe it wouJd not also
include operations identified in the earlier manual, such as support to counterdrug
operations, combating terrorism and noncombatant evacuation operations. 14
Significantly, in respect to terrorism, the 2008 doctrine notes that the greatest
threat to American national security "comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious powers, but from fragile states."IS While terrorism remains a threat which
must be addressed in the context of such operations, avoiding the impression of
engagement in a "Global Waron Terror" will undoubtedly remove a potential irritant with many coalition partners. The reference to humanitarian operations also
highlights the degree to which dealing with humanitarian disaster is increasingly
being seen in the same light as insurgency and other challenges to governance by
State authorities. 16 Both humanitarian and many other types of stability operations, which are located well down on the conflict spectrum, often involve military
forces in issues related to governance, including law enforcement. What remains to
be seen is the degree to which military forces can or must adapt their operations to
participate in a law enforcement role.
Significantly, the stability operations doctrine takes a bold step in addressing the
primary security challenge of the twenty-first century by elevating such operations
in 000 Directive 3000.05 to an equal footing with combat operations. In many
ways this doctrine is revolutionary, visionary and long overdue. The Army manual
seeks to reinforce this doctrinal advance by indicating the full spectrum of operations includes "continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive,
and stability tasks."11 That relationship is depicted as follows:l s
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The question remains, however, whether the attempt to elevate stability operations to the level of combat operations will win out over the significant historical
resistance to changing the focus on traditional "inter-State" armed conflict. To do
so, such a change in status will have to address the significant effort that will be required in terms of training and education. The challenges that arise from focusing
on armed conflict between States not only has plagued doctrine writers, but has
also impacted on attempts to clearly outline the legal framework governing operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
A Doctrinal Morass
The strength of military doctrine is that it provides an overall conceptual framework within which operations are conducted. One of the potential obstacles to
gaining acceptance for the new doctrinal term "stability operations" is that it could
appear to a cynical observer to simply be an attempt to provide a new name to an
old problem. For well over a century efforts have been made to categorize smallscale and lower-intensity conflict. Such terms have included small wars,1 9 imperial policing,2o police action,21 insurgency, low intensity conflict,22 military operations other than warp peacekeeping,24 peace enforcement,25 three block wars,26
revolutionary war, irregular warfare, war amongst the people and, more recently,
mosaic warY
These categorizations can often be used to encompass one or more of the other
doctrinal terms associated with conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
For example, the 2007 US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual
notes that "insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been
called revolutionary war or internal war."28 Further, they are "included within a
broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare."29
The development and use of the term "mosaic war" in the counterinsurgency
manual 30 itself highlights the challenge of seeking just one term to categorize contemporary complex security operations. "Mosaic war" was introduced to highlight
that contemporary COIN operations are more complicated than the 1990s concept of
"three block war" on the basis that such warfare "is diffioot for counter-insurgents to
envision as a coherent whole.")l The manual recognizes the term "stability operations" and identifies it as an essential component of COIN operations, along with
offensive and defensive operations. 32 It is within this shifting doctrinal framework
that stability operations will have to be interpreted.
The counterinsurgency manual also highlights a further complexity of contemporary conilict. In that manual "insurgency" is defined as "an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy
of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while
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increasing insurgent control. "33 Counterinsurgency operations and as a result stability operations occur not only during internal armed conflicts, but also during
periods of occupation.
Part of the challenge in applying the doctrinal term "stability operations" is that
the underlying security situations which motivated its creation are not only not
new, but have been and are the dominant form of warfare. As has been identified
by Doctor Lawrence Yates for the Combat Studies Institute Press, "[ iJf America's
armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two
centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several hundred military
undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations."34 It has
been noted that in 2006 no State-sponsored opposing armies were engaged in
armed conflict, while the number of civil wars increased.3s
Although the potential for armed conflict between States continues, as was evidenced by the 2008 armed conflict between the armed forces of Russia and Georgia, there is increasing recognition within the US Department of Defense that "the
main threat faced by the U.S. military overseas will be a complex hybrid of conventional and unconventional conflicts, waged by ' militias, insurgent groups, other
non-State actors and Third World militaries.'''36 It is within this complex security
environment that the applicable law must be identified and applied in order to ensure that military operations, including stability operations, are conducted pursuant to the "rule oflaw."

The Law
Unfortunately, it appears that international law has been no more successful than
military doctrine in definitively addressing the challenges associated with irregular warfare. Like military doctrine, the law of armed conflict has been more
readily developed and applied to regulate conflict at the inter-State level. The lack
of a comprehensive set of legal rules governing conflict outside the context of
traditional inter-State warfare has been infl uenced by a number of interrelated
factors: the post-World War II emphasis on prescribing the recourse to war between States, difficulty in categorizing conflict at the lower end of the conflict
spectrum and a general reluctance to introduce international law of armed conflict rules to what are often viewed as internal security matters. This in turn results
in considerable debate regarding what legal regime governs such conflict: the law
of armed conflict or human rights law. The analysis will now turn to discussing
this challenge.
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Emphasis on Inter-State Conflict
While the immediate post-World War II period saw the almost concurrent development of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,37 governing aspects of the conduct of
warfare, particular legal emphasis was placed on stopping or limiting future interState wars. This was perhaps best evidenced by the increasing use of the terms jus
ad bellum and jus in bello, which were designed to separate the legal analysis regarding conflict into two distinct analytical spheres. 38 The jus ad bellum branch focused
on the replacement of the balance of power approach to inter-State relations with
resurgence of the concept of bellum justum. 39 This is rel1ected in the UN Charter,
which significantly prescribed the recourse to war. 40
The extent to which war between States was to be limited is reflected in the fact
that the very use of the term "war" has become problematic. While "war" continues as part of the everyday lexicon, including in the newly issued stability operations doctrine manual,4] in a legal sense it has often been viewed since World War
II as being "outlawed."·2 This sensitivity toward describing conflict as "war" is frequently reflected in legal articles where that term is often prefaced with the qualifier that it is being used in a de facto rather than a de jure sense.H
Even the new term "armed conflict," introduced in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to describe a broad range of conflicts between States,'" came with limitations
that reflected the inter-State bias of the drafters of those Conventions. The scope of
"armed conflict" is effectively qualified in Common Article 3 of the Conventions
with reference to "armed conflict not of an international character," mirroring the
historic approach of distinguishing between public and private war. States were
more willing to deal with international armed conflict than comprehensively identify rules to govern its non-international counterpart. In effect, there was significant armed conflict in terms of scope, frequency and levels of violence to which the
rules governing conflict between States were not dearly stated to be applicable.
This emphasis by the international community on inter-State conflict is understandable given the horrific human and material cost of the total wars of the twentieth century. However, the bias toward inter-State conflict has resulted in intraState conflict not being provided as clear or rigorous a governing legal framework.
It is evident there has been an extreme reluctance on the part of States to codify
the law governing armed conflict as it applies to warfare within a State. Certainly,
the expansion of Additional ProtocoI l4S to deal with "national liberation movements" and what otherwise would be an internal armed conflict has met with significant resistance. Efforts commenced by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (JCRe) as early as 1912 to introduce law of armed conflict norms to internal
conflict continued through the immediate post-World War II period to the present day with what realistically can only be described as having had limited success.
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, while representing a significant
milestone in the twentieth-century efforts to codify the rules governing internal
conflict, in reality represents the best that could be attained in a broader effort to
have all of the Conventions apply to conflicts "not of an international character. "46
A quarter century later the success in negotiating Additional Protocol II 47 is tempered by both the lack of universal acceptance by States 48 and the relatively high
threshold for its application that leaves significant internal conflict outside its
scope. 49 Notwithstanding a trend in having law of armed conflict treaties address
both international and non-international armed conilict50 it undoubtedly was the
long-standing reluctance by States to outline in codified fo rm the rules to be applied to internal armed conflict which has resulted in efforts by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)51 and the ICRC to articulate
what customary international law rules should apply to govern internal warfare.52
These initial efforts are long overdue. However, there remains a lack of agreement
regarding the scope and content of the customary law of armed conflict as it applies
to non-international armed conflicts.
One example of the degree to which international law often focuses on interState conflict is reflected in Legal Conseqllences of the Comtmction of a Wall in the
Occllpied Palestinian TerritoryP where the International Court of lustice ruled the
invocation of Article 51 of the UN Charter required attacks that were imputable to
a foreign State and a threat originating outside of occupied territory.S4 Even where
there is a dash between State armed fo rces the jlls ad bellllm focus on limiting confli ct has left considerable room for disagreement and, as a result, confusion as to
when such clashes engage the law of armed conflict. This is evident in the assessment of the threshold of what constitutes an "armed attack."55 The reference in
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and agaimt Nicaraglla 56 to "frontier incidents" as a less grave use offorce not constituting such an attack raises the question
as to whether such incidents could constitute "armed conflict" where the law of
armed conflict would apply.
The ICfY has stated armed conflict "exists whenever there is resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. "57 In that
assessment, particular attention is paid to the intensity of the fighting and the organization of the armed groups.$8 However, the requirement for "protracted" armed
violence between opposing armed forces still results in situations where armed
forces may be engaged in fighting where it is not clear there is consensus that
"armed conflict" exists such that the law of armed conflict would apply. If that is
the case, it is not necessarily evident how the alternative legal framework of international human rights law is equipped to regulate such violence. The criteria
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established by the ICTY can be contrasted with that followed in Abella v. Argentina,
where an isolated act of armed violence between State armed forces and a rebel
armed group during a two-day period resulted in the application of the law of
armed conflict. 59
While the Nicaragua judgment has garnered considerable criticism, it highlights
that in the context of the inter-State use of force and in respect to military action
between State and non-State actors there is a wide range of activity that does not
neatly fall within the parameters of traditional armed conflict. Such contemporary
operations can include peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, hostage rescue,
humanitarian intervention and attacks against terrorist groups. These types of operations fall within the scope of stability operations. Yet this is an area which has
not garnered sufficient attention in terms of clearly identifying the law which applies to the conduct of those operations.
Identification of the applicable law can be further clouded by references to "policing" language when describing the types of operations. For example, referring to UN
military operations as "police actions" or counterterrorist operations as "extraterritorial law enforcement"6/) does not mean such military activity is governed by a
law enforcement legal framework. Those military operations would, to the extent
they involve combat, be governed by the law of armed conflict regardless of
whether such fighting is called a "war."61
Providing Clarity: Which Nonns Apply?
The degree of uncertainty regarding what law applies to the wide range of international military operations falling within the scope of stability operations should
raise significant concern. Whether perceived as a "gap" that must be filled , or simply a grey zone that must be clarified, the reality is that there is no clear international consensus as to what law applies to a wide range of international operations
involving the use, or potential use, of armed force by State armed forces.
It is a problem often addressed by reference to the "spirit and principles" of the
law of armed conflict62 or to applying that law to all military operations as a matter
of direction from national authorities. 63 While strong policy statements or national
direction provides an important indication that the law of armed conflict should
apply to operations outside the scope of traditional anned conflict, there is considerable room for confusion and debate, particularly in light of the continued application of human rights during armed conflict. 64
The confusion results, in part, because of the complexity of such operations.
Further, the requirement to interface with the civilian population during the conduct of many stability operations can significantly impact on the freedom to use
force. For example, in terms of controlling the use of force the question will
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inevitably arise as to whether military forces are using force in a combat or law enforcement role. At some point the law of armed conflict as a lex specialis must be
reconciled with the application of the norms associated with a h uman rights-based
law enforcement framework. It is not completely clear how such reconciliation can
occur if the law of armed conflict is only accepted as applying as a matter of policy
or national direction .
The breadth of the potential tasks assigned to military forces under the stability
operations doctrine also introduces other significant challenges. The rule of law
tasks inherent in stability operations require an understanding oflegal norms and
standards well beyond a simple familiarity with the law of armed conflict. There
has been significant debate regarding the impact of human rights norms during periods of occupation6S and even a lack of consensus of what constitutes an occupation at law. 66 This can result in a potential broadening of situations in which the
interface between occupation law and human rights may have to be considered.
To the extent the stability operations doctrine encompasses periods of occupation, that debate will continue to have relevance. However, the law of armed confli ct and human rights interface might be seen to be less relevant to stability
operations outside the context of occupation, although questions will continue to
arise as to the impact of Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II or customary
international law on human rights law during internal armed conflicts. 67 The ability to interpret and apply international human rights and host-nation laws will
raise significant challenges fo r military commanders and their legal advisers, who
likely will be more comfortable applying the law applicable to armed conflict.
Is it War or Policing?
A particular challenge for military forces is that stability operations are usually conducted among the people. 68 This interface often places those forces in the difficult
situation of policing the local population in addition to fighting organized armed
groups. This occurs regardless of whether those forces are operating under the legal
framework of occupation during an international armed conflict or in respect to a
multinational coalition effort engaged in combating the counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan.
Perhaps the most graphic evidence of the unwillingness or inability of the international community to deal directly with this challenge is that neither the responsibility for, nor the conduct of, a policing function is directly addressed in the blackletter law governing occupation. 69 Perhaps the closest reference can be found in
Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations,70 which provides that the occupying
power "shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
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possible, public order and safety [civil life J, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."71
The reality is that where a military force controls territory and comes in contact
with the local population it may, particularly where the failing State is unable to do
so, be required to perform a policing role. This occurs regardless of whether the
force is operating on behalf of an occupying power, as part of a multinational coalition or at the invitation of a failing State. Reference to this policing task is found in
FM 3-07 (2008), where it is noted that "[n]ormally the responsibility for establishing civil security tasks belongs to the military from the outset of operations through
transition, when host-nation security and police forces assume this role."72 This
policing task can be problematic for two reasons. First, military forces may be neither
trained nor equipped to perform a policing function. Secondly, performance of a
policing function concurrently with ongoing operations against insurgent forces
can create a complex and, at times, unclear interface between the law of armed conflict and the human rights-based norms governing policing.73
At this stage the international community is just coming to terms with how
force should be regulated at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. O ne approach
adopted by the Israeli High Court of Justice in the Targeted Killing decision?4 is a
blended one based, in part, on Israeli "internal law" being applied in a law-ofarmed-conflict targeting analysis which has a preference for "[aJerest, investigation, and tria!."?5 Here the domestic law requirements reflect the law enforcement
norms of international human rights law in favoring capture over killing. An alternative approach is a "situation based" one which looks at the type of threat and
then applies the appropriate legal regime to control the use of force by security
forces. This means the law of armed conflict is applied to incidents of violence related to the armed conflict, while human rights-based law enforcement standards
are applicable to policing scenarios.76
Whichever approach is applied, there are significant doctrine, training and operational deployment challenges for military forces. The question is not necessarily
one of "targeting" or deciding when someone is taking a direct part in hostilities.
For soldiers manning checkpoints or defending convoys against suicide bombers
or improvised explosive devices their reaction will often be governed by self-defense
rules. The inevitable restriction on the use of fo rce in counterinsurgency operations points to an application of graduated minimum force not normally associated with anned conflict. The challenge of reacting to such threats is not helped by
the present lack of clarity in the law, particularly in light of the decisions being
asked of young coalition and International Security Assistance Force soldiers operating in complex security situations such as Afghanistan.
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The United States and Coalition Partners: On the Leading Edge or A lone?
Having outlined a number of the doctrinal and legal challenges associated with the
stability operations doctrine. there is also the question of how this US doctrine will
resonate in a coalition environment. Given the likelihood that the United States
will continue to conduct operations as the dominant member of international coalitions. it is evident that a common understanding among coalition partners of
what stability operations are will be helpful in ensuring interoperability. Further.
the military doctrine ofthe United States, as the major State on the international
stage regarding military capability. is a significant factor in tenns of developing
customary international law.
In considering the approach of allied countries toward stability operations. it
appears that the United States has a much more robust. well-developed and ambitious vision for such operations. For example. the Canadian Forces (CF) have no
separate stability operations doctrine. although there is doctrine for CF operations
generally, as well as peace support operations, humanitarian operations. disaster
relief operations and noncombatant evacuation operations. that would fall under
the US stability operations doctrine umbrella.77
As often occurs in situations where military forces are confronted with new
operational challenges. Canadian doctrine appears to be driven by experiences
gained at the tactical level in Afghanistan. The Canadian Army has developed two
manuals that refer to stability operations. 78 The new doctrine focuses on counterinsurgency. with stability operations being addressed at the tactical level. Tactical
activities comprise four parts: offensive. defensive, stability and enabling operations. thereby setting out "full-spectrum operations."79 Stability operations are
defined as "a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces. often in
conjunction with other agencies to maintain. restore or establish a climate of order."80 To the extent these manuals reflect the focus of Canadian Forces operations. it is clear this approach is not as comprehensive as that adopted by the
United States.
At this stage NATO does not appear to have embraced stability operations as a
separate strategic- or operational-level concept. It is perhaps telling that the 2006
NATO Handbook refers to the Afghanistan mission as an international peacekeeping effort.81 One of the factors that may impact on a wider allied adoption of the
term "stability operations" is found in the indication that part of the rationale for
the US development of a separate stability operations doctrine may be the negative
connotation attached to "peace operations." As is noted in a 2006 Congressional
Research Service Issue Brief for Congress. "[ p leacekeeping has been the traditional
generic term .... More recently. in an attempt to capture their ambiguity and
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complexity, and perhaps to avoid the stigma of failure attached to peacekeeping,
they have become known as 'stabilization and reconstruction' operations, or more
simply 'stability' operations."82
As a result, there may be a number of factors that may impact on the degree to
which coalition partners embrace the US concept of stability operations. First,
peacekeeping and other peace support operations do not necessarily have the same
negative connotation outside the United States. Therefore, it may not necessarily
be evident to other States why a new term is required. Second, the very "ambiguity
and complexity" of such operations may cause other military forces to embrace
more narrowly focused mission-specific doctrine. Third , other nations may neither be involved, nor plan to get involved, in as wide a variety of stability operations
as the US doctrine appears to cover. Accordingly, potential coalition partners may
continue to use separate doctrinal terms such as peace support operations or humanitarian operations. Finally, the traditional approach of State militaries in focusing on State-versus-State conflict may still be prevalent among the potential
allies of the United States. This in turn may limit any acceptance that stability operations have an equal status with traditionaJ combat operations. None of these factors will necessarily preclude the conduct of coalition operations within the wider
stability operations doctrine. However, it may mean that the US military will have
to be prepared to interface with coalition partners on a different level (e.g., tactical)
and with terms that reflect only a partial acceptance by other States of
subcomponents of the overarching stability operations doctrine.

The Future
The question remains as to whether this new doctrine is simply the latest attempt in
a long history of short-lived efforts to definitively categorize unconventional confli ct. While it is likely an answer to that question will only be provided with the passage of time, it is clear the US military has taken a significant step in creating the
stability operations doctrine. It is an approach which seeks to break the historical
reluctance to address warfare outside of State-versus-State conflict. Combined
with other publications such as the counterinsurgency manuaJ and the Rule of Law
Handbook: A Practitioner's Guide for Judge Advocates, there is evidence significant
effort continues to be placed on developing doctrine and guidance that specifically
addresses unique aspects of counterinsurgency operations, the dominant form of
warfare in the twenty-first century.
Unfortunately, it does not appear the doctrine can point to a comprehensive,
clearly articulated legal framework for such operations. Perhaps this is understandable given the inability of the international community to definitively come to
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grips with this challenge. This is graphically evidenced by the contin ued reliance on
a "spirit and principles" or national-direction approach to applying the law of
armed conflict to operations conducted at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
However, until d ear direction on the legal framework can be provided, there is a
danger such operations will be conducted at the "vanishing point" of the law of
armed conflict. In this respect it could be the complexity and ambiguity inherent in
the scope of stability operations doctrine that sows the seeds of its downfall.
Yet such an outcome can be avoided. The doctrine itself is visionary in that it
shines a spotlight on the very type of operations that dominate the international
scene today. Given the number, scope and complexity of such operations and the
fact that international intelVention, either under a UN mandate or otherwise, is a
common occurrence, it may be time for a dear statement by States as to what law of
armed conflict applies beyond general reference to Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II (ifit applies) or the suggested rules of
the JCRC customary law study. It may very well be that the credibility of the doctrine of "stability operations," which is based upon establishing legitimacy and the
rule of law, will itself be dependent on such a definitive articulation of customary
norms.
As is noted in FM 3-07 (2008), intelVening forces "carry with them an innate
perception of legitimacy that is further strengthened by consistent performance
confonning to the standards of national and internationallaw."S4 However, unless
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